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The Future of Desegregation After Dowell:
Returning to Pre-Brown Days?
Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell'
L INTRODUCTION
Court-ordered desegregation is one of the major social controversies of
our time. School systems that have long been subject to the remedies of
desegregation want to be relieved of judicial intervention and want control
returned to the local school board. This desire, however, sometimes conflicts
with the mandate in Brown v. Board of Education2 that "in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."3
In Dowell, the Supreme Court concluded that local control can be
returned to a school board, with the resultant elimination of busing, so long
as the district has taken all steps "practicable" to eliminate vestiges of past
discrimination.4 This Note will examine these requirements for the return of
local control to the school board and how they could conflict with the
mandate of Brown v. Board of Education. It will also address whether, under
Dowell, a finding of unitariness will automatically dissolve an injunctive
decree.
II. HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT AND DESEGREGATION
A. The Implementation of Desegregation Remedies: 1954-1976
The law of desegregation had its beginnings in Brown v. Board of
Education,5 where the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of "separate but
equal '6 has no place in public education and that "[s]eparate educational
facilities are inherently unequal."7 The Court held that classifying students
by race was suspect, and separate educational facilities violated the equal
1. 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown 1].
3. Id. at 495.
4. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637.
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. This doctrine was expounded by the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
540 (1896), in which the Court upheld a Louisiana law providing for segregation of
railroad passengers by race.
7. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.
1
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protection rights of black children under the 14th amendment The Court
stated: "To separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone."9
The Court did not address the question of remedies, however, until 1955
in Brown v. Board of Education,10 when the Court delegated responsibility
for supervising desegregation to the federal district courts, "[b]ecause of their
proximity to local conditions and the possible need for further hearings.""
The Supreme Court empowered the federal courts to "enter such orders and
decrees ... as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a
racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these
cases.i12 Beyond these simple edicts, the standards for determining when a
system violated the Constitution and the remedies available were to be decided
on a case-by-case basis by the federal courts. 3 The Court relied upon the
good faith of the people to implement desegregation, but was met with stern
resistance in many cases.'4 Even with the strong resistance in the South, the
Supreme Court rarely intervened to enforce the principles of desegregation. 15
Finally, in the late 1960s, the Court appeared to run out of patience with
state and local practices designed to avoid desegregation. In Green v. County
School Board,6 the Court struck down a "freedom-of-choice" plan and
established the principle that school boards were "charged with the affirmative
duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system
in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." 7
Therefore, the New Kent County School Board was given the burden of
8. Id. at 493.
9. Id. at 494.
10. 349 U.S. 294 (1954) [hereinafter Brown II].
11. Id. at 299.
12. Id. at 301.
13. See Note, The Unitariness Finding and Its Effect on MandatoryDesegregation
Injunctions, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 551, 557 (1987).
14. See Chandler, The End of School Busing? School Desegregation and the
Finding of Unitary Status, 40 OKLA. L. REv. 519, 524 (1987).
15. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 229 (1964) ("There has
been entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed in enforcing the [constitu-
tional rights] . . . ."); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1063) (invalidating a
transfer policy where students could transfer to any school where they would be in the
racial majority); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (where the Supreme Court
reprimanded the Governor of Arkansas for attempting to prevent desegregation with
National Guard troops).
16. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
17. Id. at 437-38.
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coming forward with a plan that "promises to realistically work now.., until
it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely removed.""
The next major desegregation case was Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education,9 in which the Supreme Court gave the federal courts
more exact guidelines for desegregating a dual school system. The Court held
that "[o]nce a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district
court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad .... .20 The Court
approved the use of racial quotas2' and mandatory student reassignments in
fashioning a remedy," and cautioned that the existence of one-race schools
called for a presumption against their constitutionality." Further, the Court
approved the use of busing to achieve racial desegregation, but limited it and
other remedies when they endanger "the health of the children or significantly
impinge on the educational process."'4 The Court made it clear, however,
that once desegregation has been accomplished, there is no yearly constitution-
al requirement to adjust racial composition in schools.25 After desegregation,
the federal courts should have no need to intervene unless there is a "showing
that either the school authorities or some other agency of the State has
deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns .... U26
Until 1973, most desegregation cases occurred in the South, where
statutes or state constitutions had required racial segregation.' 7  In the
Supreme Court's first Northern desegregation case, Keyes v. School District
No. 1,28 the Court distinguished between de facto and de jure segregation.
The difference between de jure segregation and de facto segregation is the
intent of the school district to segregate.29 The Court held that only de jure
segregation, that is, "a current condition of segregation resulting from
intentional state action"30 constitutes a violation of equal protection. A
showing of de jure segregation in a substantial portion of the school system,
18. Id. at 439 (court's emphasis).
19. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
20. Id. at 15.
21. Id. at 25.
22. Id. at 28-29.
23. Id. at 26.
24. Id. at 30-31.
25. Id. at 32.
26. Id.
27. E.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 1 (North Carolina); Green, 391 U.S. at 430
(Virginia); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (Tennessee); Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (Arkansas).
28. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
29. Id. at 208.
30. Id. at 205.
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however, would be enough to presume intentional segregation in all other
areas.3 This presumption could be rebutted only by showing that segrega-
tive intent was not a motivating factor or that past segregative acts did not
"create or contribute to the current segregated condition."32
Milliken v. Bradley93 is usually cited as the beginning of the end of
desegregation.' In Milliken, the first case in which the Supreme Court
overruled a desegregation decree,35 the Supreme Court refused to allow an
interdistrict remedy36 unless it was shown that "racially discriminatory acts
of the state or local school districts ... have been a substantial cause of
interdistrict segregation. "37 In overturning the interdistrict remedy, the Court
emphasized the history of public education in the United States: "No single
tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the
operation of schools ... ."' Following the precedent established in
Milliken, the Supreme Court held in Pasadena City Board of Education v.
Spangler9 that desegregation decrees were never meant to operate in
perpetuity and that the federal courts could not require a school district to alter
its school zones every year to respond to residential changes.4
31. Id. at 208.
32. Id. at 210-11.
33. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
34. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTITUTIONAL LAW 1495 (2d ed. 1988)
(Milliken signaled the Supreme Court's mounting hesitation in the school desegrega-
tion area).
35. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 717.
36. An interdistrict remedy is also known as a multidistrict remedy. This remedy
usually arises when a large metropolitan area with many school districts is segregated.
Courts may wish to include the suburban districts in the remedy, compelling them to
agree to busing students. After Milliken, the federal courts can no longer inflict this
on multidistricts, unless certain conditions are met. Id. at 744-45. A discussion of
these conditions and interdistrict remedies in general is beyond the scope of this Note.
See Goedert, Jenkins v. Missouri: The Future of Interdistrict School Desegregation,
76 GEo. LJ 1867 (1988).
37. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745.
38. Id.
39. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
40. Id. at 436-37.
[Vol. 561144
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B. Defining a Unitary School System
1. The Meaning of Unitariness
The first step in terminating judicial oversight of desegregation remedies
is the finding that a dual school system has achieved "unitary" status.41 The
lower federal courts are not in agreement as to the exact meaning of
unitary,42 and the Supreme Court has never defined the term more precisely
than it did in Green, where it related the indicia of a dual system as
segregation among students, faculty, and staff, segregation of transportation,
and segregation of extracurricular activities.43  The determination of
unitariness is within the discretion of the trial judges in light of the circum-
stances of the case before them. 4 At a hearing to determine whether
unitariness has been achieved, the school board has the burden of showing that
all vestiges of past discrimination have been removed.4 5 Vestiges have been
defined by one commentator as "those effects of intentional discrimination
which, if left unremedied, perpetuate the hallmarks of the regime of school
segregation."' In Green, the Supreme Court identified the areas in which
all vestiges must be removed as "every facet of school operations--faculty,
staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities." 47
41. The term unitary had its first inception in Green, where the Court stated that
"[t]he transition to a unitary, nonracial system of public education was and is the
ultimate end to be brought about.... ." Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,
436 (1968).
42. Some courts hold that unitariness cannot be achieved without all the effects
of segregation being remedied. See, e.g., United States v. Lawrence County School
Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1037 (5th Cir. 1986); Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423, 1426
(11th Cir. 1985); Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir.
1983). Other courts, however, hold that unitary status can be achieved upon successful
implementation of a desegregation plan. See, e.g., Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d
521, 533 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986); Georgia State Conference of
Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1413-14 (11th Cir. 1985); Mapp v.
Board of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 876, 881-83 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
43. Green, 391 U.S. at 435. See also Note, The Unitariness Dilemma: The First
Circuit's Attempt to Develop a Test for Determining When a System is Unitary, 66
WASH U.L.Q. 615, 624 (1988).
44. See Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After a Finding of Unitariness in
School Desegregation Litigation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 633, 662-63 (1987).
45. See id. at 657-61.
46. Note, Unitary School Systems and Underlying Vestiges of State-Imposed
Segregation, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 794, 800 (1987).
47. Green, 391 U.S. at 435.
1991] 1145
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2. The Consequences of a Finding of Unitariness
There are two major consequences of a finding of unitariness. The first
result is a shifting of the burden of proof to the plaintiff residents. As is often
the case with elements difficult to prove, allocation of the burden of proof is
often dispositive of who wins and who loses a case. It is even more
dispositive in desegregation cases, because after a shifting of the burden, the
plaintiffs can no longer rely upon prior segregative acts such as statutes that
mandated segregated schools or specific school board policies of segregation
to demonstrate intentional segregation.4 Instead, they must show subsequent
intentional segregative acts aimed at reestablishing a dual school system to
satisfy the Keyes requirement of de jure segregation. 49 This is a difficult
evidentiary burden for the plaintiffs, and yet, even if the plaintiffs meet this
burden, the school board need only respond by showing de facto reasons for
its actions °
A second major consequence to the finding of unitariness is that it
substantially diminishes the power of the court, and returns some control of
educational policies to the school board.51 One of the most important issues
associated with this shift in control is the extent of control that is actually
returned. There remains much confusion about whether a finding of
unitariness completely terminates the court's jurisdiction in the case, returning
all control to the school board and dissolving the injunctive decree. 2 In
Riddick v. School Board,53 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that once unitariness is found, the district court is totally divested
of jurisdiction.? Other circuits have made similar holdings,55 but there is
not a general consensus among the federal courts. For example, the Eleventh
Circuit has determined that jurisdiction over the school board continues even
48. See generally Note, supra note 44, at 665-68.
49. See Chandler, supra note 14, at 544-45.
50. See Note, supra note 44, at 662.
51. See id. at 620.
52. See generally Annotation, Circumstances Warranting JudicialDetermination
or Declaration of Unitary Status With Regard to Schools Operating Under Court-
ordered or Supervised Desegregation Plans and the Effects of Such Declarations, 94
A.LR. FD. 667, 698-723 (1989).
53. 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
54. Id. at 538-39.
55. See, e.g., Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 318-19 (1st Cir. 1987) (unitary
attainment in student assignments terminates authority of federal court); United States
v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1987) (the notion that a district can be
declared unitary but still be under federal court jurisdiction is "at war with itself").
[Vol. 561146
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after a finding of unitariness so that the court may continue to exercise its
authority to some degree.56
C. Modification or Dissolution of the Injunctive Decree
1. Litigated decrees vs. Consent decrees
Courts use two types of injunctive decrees to enforce desegregation
orders: litigated decrees and consent decrees. Litigated decrees are "based on
the court's assessment of the appropriate application of the law to a predicted
course of conduct by the obligor that interferes with the rights of the
beneficiary."5 7 Consent decrees, on the other hand, are "agreement[s] of the
parties made under the sanction of, and approved by, the court not as a result
of a judicial determination, but merely as their agreement to be bound by
certain stipulated facts. "58 Litigated decrees are based solely on the legitima-
cy of the law in place when they are entered.59 Subsequent changes in the
law may mandate modification of litigated decrees. 3 Consent decrees, on
the other hand, are also dependent upon the parties' agreement, because they
are long-term contracts.61
2. General Considerations
Injunctive decrees require compliance by the enjoined parties until the
decree is either dissolved or modified. 62 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b) governs the modification or dissolution of injunctive decrees.63 Rule
60(b) provides that the court may modify or dissolve an injunctive decree if
the enjoined party shows that "the judgment has been satisfied.., or it is no
56. E.g., United States v. Board of Educ., 794 F.2d 1541, 4543 (11th Cir. 1986)
(rejected idea that finding of unitariness terminated jurisdiction as too rigid); Lee v.
Macon County Board of Educ., 681 F. Supp. 730, 737 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (leeway exists
regarding issue of whether unitariness finding vacates a desegregation order); Keyes
v. School Dist., 670 F. Supp. 1513, 1516 (D. Colo. 1987) ("[w]hen unitary status [is]
achieved, court supervision can be removed only when it is reasonably certain that
future actions will be free from institutional discriminatory intent.").
57. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the
Federal Courts, 64 Tnx. L. REV. 1101, 1132 (1986) (emphasis added).
58. BARRON'S LAw DICrIONARY 119 (2d ed. 1984) (emphasis added).
59. Jost, supra note 57, at 1133-34.
60. Id. at 1134.
61. Id. at 1135.
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longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application
.... "64 Courts have wide latitude in deciding to modify or dissolve an
injunctive decree and will apply the standard on a case-by-case basis.65 A
recent commentator contends there are three factors that courts generally
assess in deciding whether to dissolve or modify an injunction.6 First, a
court will "consider any changes in circumstances" rendering protection of the
plaintiffs unnecessary.67 Second, the court will look at whether these new
circumstances will create a "hardship for the enjoined party if the injunctive
decree remains unchanged."6 Third, a court will examine any change in law
making the decree improper 9 These factors were first articulated in United
States v. Swift & Co.,70 which involved a consent decree in an antitrust suit
between the United States and five leading meat-packing companies.71 In
upholding the district court's denial of motions to modify the consent decree,
the Supreme Court stated that:
[t]he inquiry for us is whether the changes are so important that dangers,
once substantial, have become attenuated to a shadow .... Nothing less
than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
conditions should lead us to change what was decreed after years of
litigation with the consent of all concerned. 72
Although the case only involved a consent decree, the Court further held that
the power to modify is the same "whether the decree has been entered after
litigation or by consent,"' indicating that the same standard should be
applied to both litigated decrees and consent decrees.
In addition to these factors, desegregation injunctive decrees call for
special considerations. In Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler74,
the Supreme Court stated that residential changes could only be the basis for
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).
65. Note, supra note 13, at 564.
66. Id. at 564-65.
67. Id. at 564. See also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244,
248 (1968) ("decree may be changed upon an appropriate showing"); United States v.
Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 117-18 (1932) ("The question is whether [modification]
can be made without prejudice to the interests of the classes whom this particular
restraint was intended to protect.").
68. Note, supra note 13, at 564-65.
69. Id.
70. 286 U.S. 106 (1931).
71. Id. at 106-07.
72. Id. at 119.
73. Id. at 114.
74. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
[Vol. 561148
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modification if the changes were the result of intentional segregative action.75
Because school desegregation decrees are temporary, once the "transition to
a racially nondiscriminatory school system"76 is effected, the decree is to be
terminated. Finally, there is also the unresolved question of whether a finding
of unitariness will dissolve desegregation decrees.
77
III. COURT-ORDERED DESEGREGATION TODAY
A. History of the Case
Desegregation litigation in Oklahoma City began 30 years ago.' In
1961, black students and their parents sued the Oklahoma City Board of
Education to end de jure segregation in the public school system.79 In 1963,
the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma found intentional
segregation in the schools and housing of Oklahoma City, and ordered the
Board to desegregate.80 In response to the court's mandate, the Board
adopted new school boundaries, but a special transfer policy was also included
which allowed children to transfer to schools in which their race was in the
majority.81 The Board and the district court continued to litigate over the
desegregation issue, with the Board strongly opposing desegregation. 8 At
one point the district court noted that the Board's actions, allegedly intended
to desegregate, were actually hindering it and even reversing desegregation
and destroying integrated neighborhoods.83
Finally, in 1972, because the Board refused to offer a meaningful
desegregation plan of its own,8 the district court ordered the Board to adopt
a "Finger Plan."'  The "Finger Plan" is based on a remedy primarily
75. Id. at 435-36.
76. Brown 1I, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1954).
77. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
78. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Schools v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630
(1991).
79. Id. at 633.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 640 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. Id. The Board adopted another "special" transfer policy, which had the same
effect as the first one. Id.
83. Id. Eight of nine new schools in 1965 were located to serve all-white or a
majority of all-white neighborhoods. Id. Also, the Board's inflexible attendance zones





Hannel: Hannel: Future of Desegregation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
involving busing of students." Three years later, after operating the "Finger
Plan" successfully, the Board filed a motion to close the case.87 In 1977, the
district court granted the Board's motion and issued an order terminating the
case, which declared that Oklahoma City had achieved unitary status.88 The
order ended the district court's supervision, but did not dissolve the injunctive
decree.8 9 No party appealed the order.90
B. The Disputed Action
The Oklahoma City School Board continued to operate the "Finger Plan"
until 1985.91 In 1984, the Board faced demographic changes that increased
the distances that black students had to be bused to attend desegregated
schools. 92 In response to these demographic changes, the Board adopted the
Student Reassignment Plan ("SRP"),93 which allowed neighborhood assign-
ments for students in grades K-4 beginning in the 1985-86 school year. 4
Under the SRP, the student ratio in over one-half of the Oklahoma City
schools was either 90% Black or 90% non-Black 5 Respondents filed a
motion to reopen case, charging that the school district was not unitary and
that the SRP was a return to segregation.
96
86. The Finger Plan adopted by the Board was as follows:
a. Kindergartners attended neighborhood schools;
b. Grades 1-4 attended formerly all-white schools with black children being
bused to those schools;
c. Grade 5 would attend formerly all-black schools with white children being
bused to them;
d. Students in upper grades would be bused to various schools to maintain
integrated schools; and
e. Stand-alone schools for all grades would be located in integrated neighbor-
hoods.
Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City, 890 F.2d 1483, 1486 (10th Cir. 1989).





92. Id. at 634.
93. The SRP has also been called a retrogression plan because it greatly increases
the number of minority students attending one-race schools. See Landsberg, The
Desegregated School System and the Retrogression Plan, 48 LA. L. REV. 789, 800-01
(1988).
94. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 634.
95. Id. at 641 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 631.
1150 [Vol. 56
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After this filing, a sequence of legal events ensued. The district court
refused to reopen the case, declaring that the 1977 order was a finding of
unitariness, which acted as res judicata.97 The court of appeals reversed and
remanded, holding that while the 1977 order was a finding of unitariness,
there was no language dissolving the injunctive decree.98 On remand, the
district court concluded that the injunctive decree should be vacated. 99 The
district court reasoned that demographic changes, in no way influenced by the
Board, had made the "Finger Plan" unworkable, and that the Board had
operated busing for over a decade in good-faith compliance with the injunctive
decree. 1'0 The court of appeals again reversed.'O It held that an injunc-
tive decree cannot be lifted unless it meets the Swift standard requiring a
"grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions."'0 2 The Board
of Education of Oklahoma City petitioned for certiorari, which was granted
in 1990.13
C. The Instant Decision
1. Unitariness
In Dowell, the Supreme Court first considered whether the respondents
could contest the 1987 order when they had not appealed the 1977 order.' °
While the district court may have found that the district was unitary in 1977,
it had not clearly dissolved the injunctive decree.'05 The Supreme Court
held that when such a decree is to be dissolved or terminated, respondents are
97. Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. School, 606 F. Supp. 1548
(W.D. Okla. 1985), rev'd, 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938
(1986).
98. Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. School, 795 F.2d 1516
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
99. Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Schools, 677 F. Supp. 1503
(W.D. Okla. 1987), vacated, 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630
(1991).
100. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 631.
101. Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Schools, 890 F.2d. 1483
(10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991). See also Terez, Protecting the Remedy
of Unitary Schools, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 41, 48 (1986).
102. Dowell, 890 F.2d. at 1490.
103. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 635.
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entitled to a "precise statement" to that effect.'( 6 Ambiguous statements that
indicate a unitariness finding but do not appear to dissolve the injunctive
decree are not enough.'0 7 Therefore, the Court stated that while the 1977
order did bind the parties as to a finding of unitary status, it did not terminate
the injunctive decree because there was no direct language of dissolution 0
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court considered the meaning
of the word "unitary. 1°0 It noted that the lower courts have been inconsis-
tent in their use of the word." 0 The lower courts have generally taken two
different views: (1) "a school district that has completely remedied all
vestiges of past discrimination,""' or (2), "any school district that has
currently desegregated student assignments, whether or not that status is solely
the result of a court-imposed desegregation plan. 012 The Supreme Court
stated that the word unitary should be used "to describe a school system which
has been brought into compliance with the command of the Constitution."
113
2. Injunctive Decree
The Supreme Court next considered the standard for lifting an injunctive
decree in a desegregation case. The Court rejected the court of appeals
reliance on the Swift standard of a "grievous wrong evoked by new and
unforeseen conditions."". The Court distinguished Dowell from Swift by
stating that the decree in Swift was meant to operate in perpetuity, while
desegregation decrees are clearly a "temporary measure to remedy past
discrimination."" Because desegregation decrees are temporary measures,
the Swift standard is too strict, subjecting a school district to judicial overview
indefinitely. ' The Court held that the proper federal standard to apply in
determining "a sufficient showing of constitutional compliance" to warrant
dissolution or modification of a desegregation decree is whether "the purposes





111. Id. at 635.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. The Court noted that Swift had been narrowed by United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968), which stated that Swift holds that a
decree can be changed once the purposes of the decree have been "fully achieved."
United Shoe, 391 U.S. at 248.
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of the desegregation litigation had been fully achieved.""17 To this end, the
court must examine: (1) "whether the Board had complied in good faith with
the 'desegregation decree since it was entered,"" 8 and (2) "whether the
vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practica-
ble.""' Moreover, courts should consider the elements listed in Green:
student assignments, faculty, staff, transportation, extra-curricular activities and
facilities. 2 The Court concluded with a reminder that while a school district
that has been released from a desegregation injunctive decree no longer
requires direct judicial supervision, it is still subject to the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment."' The Court then reversed and
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the Board was
entitled to have the decree terminated as of 1985."
IV. THE FUTURE OF DESEGREGATION IN THE POST-UNITARY PERIOD
Dowell answers few questions and leaves many of the major desegrega-
tion issues undecided. The decision can be commended for permitting
dissolution of the injunctive decree only when the "purposes of the desegrega-
tion litigation have been fully achieved,"'23 and for requiring a precise
statement when a decree is to be dissolved or modified before such can occur.
Thus, it appears that a mere finding of "unitariness" will be insufficient to
terminate jurisdiction unless the court specifically dissolves the injunctive
decree.
The Court's definition of unitary, however, merely perpetuates the
controversy surrounding that term and fails to give the federal courts clear
guidance on the issue. The Court first indicates that unitary means constitu-
tional compliance,2 which it later implies will allow dissolution of the
injunctive decree."u Therefore, while the Court states that the injunctive
decree can only be lifted once its purposes have been "fully achieved," it
implies that this happens upon a finding of constitutional compliance, or
unitariness. These ambiguities do nothing to clarify the issue of unitariness
for the lower courts, who will continue to apply their various standards of
117. Id.
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unitariness with no uniformity.'6 Therefore, school districts with substantial
similarities could get different results depending upon the circuit in which they
are located. 27
The Court's rationale for rejecting the Swift standard is sound, because
desegregation decrees have never been thought to be permanent.128 In
fashioning a different standard for desegregation decrees, however, the Court
has ignored a number of prevailing issues in desegregation. The standard to
be used in dissolving a desegregation injunctive decree requires the courts to
examine only the good-faith compliance of the Board and whether the visible
indicia of a segregated school system (vestiges) are eliminated to the extent
practicable. 129 This allows district courts to lift injunctions even if the less
visible effects of segregation still exist.1 30 For example, under this standard,
a court may not be able to consider segregative residential patterns as
remaining vestiges of segregation in the schools, even though precedent
indicates that many residential patterns are perpetuated by segregative
acts.1  Indeed, the Board in Dowell had destroyed some integrated neigh-
borhoods by adopting zones that encouraged "white flight. 132  Many
commentators and courts have acknowledged that segregated schools
perpetuate segregated residential patterns and that residential patterns should
be considered a vestige of segregation. 33 Unlike some other vestiges, residen-
tial patterns, once established, are difficult to alter.134 Many decades may
pass before there is a need for the construction of new schools that might aid
in correcting segregative residential patterns. 35 The Supreme Court, by
126. For various views of the definition and application of unitariness, see
Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 533 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938
(1986); Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423, 1426 (11th Cir. 1985); Ross v. Houston
Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983).
127. See Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 636. The Court addressed the inconsistent use of
"unitary" in the lower courts.
128. See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
129. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 636.
130. Id. at 644 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,728 n.7 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 303
F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1969).
132. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 640 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133. See Note, supra note 46, at 800-01.
134. Id. at 802.
135. Some courts and commentators have recognized that some vestiges of dejure
segregation are not quickly abolished. See, e.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 554 F. Supp.
169, 170 (D. Mass. 1982), aft'd, 726 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1984) ("[t]he vestiges of
pervasive and long-standing purposeful discrimination in public education are neither
simply nor quickly eradicated"); Note, supra note 46, at 802. ("underlying vestiges
1154 [Vol. 56
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ignoring this less visible vestige of segregation, is allowing present segregated
residential areas to thrive, and may even be destroying some of the desegrega-
tion that has already been accomplished.
In addition, the new standard fails to consider the threat of re-segregation
and the feeling of inferiority promulgated by segregation as vestiges of
previous de jure segregation. Throughout the history of desegregation, the
Supreme Court has emphasized the stigmatic effect of segregation on black
children and the need to eradicate racial discrimination." The Court has
also urged school districts to totally eliminate racial separation and maintain
integrated schools. 137 In order for the lower courts to enforce these direc-
tives, the standard for dissolution should also include consideration of whether
the school board has done all practicable to eliminate "vestiges capable of
inflicting stigmatic harm."138 Therefore, dissolution of the injunction should
not be possible so long as further segregation continues, even in those school
districts adjudged unitary. Modification of the decree to return some local
control to the school district could occur, but judicial intervention is necessary
to some extent to protect black children from this stigma.
By disregarding these issues in forming the standard for dissolution, the
Supreme Court has opened the door for widespread declarations of unitariness
coupled with dissolutions of injunctive decrees. With these dissolutions,
school boards will be able to take future actions, such as the dismantling of
the desegregation remedies, so long as they are not acting out of discriminato-
ry intent-intent that will be virtually impossible for plaintiffs to prove. 39
By allowing such a result, the Court has ignored racial reality in the United
States and precedent of the oldest desegregation cases. Many districts that
have been desegregated for a decade or more strongly oppose desegregation.
may take many more years to be eliminated").
136. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) (integration should
"restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied
in the absence of such conduct."); Swann-v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 25-26 (1971) (discussion of the "state-imposed stigma of segregation"); Green
v. New Kent County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,442 (1968) (desegregation plan should
"fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to a system without a
'white' school and a 'negro' school, but just schools."); Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483,493-94
(1954) ("Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect on colored children.").
137. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 251 n.31 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (school boards must also preserve
an integrated school system); Green v. Green County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436
(1968) ("the transition to a unitary, non-racial system of public education was and is
the ultimate end to be brought about .... ).
138. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 647 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
139. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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In fact, many school board campaigns in major cities have centered on the
issue of desegregation, with continued opposition based upon racial consider-
ations.14' In the face of this strong opposition to racial equality in public
schools, the Court should not abandon the strict standards established since
Brown, nor should it allow school districts to avoid desegregation remedies
with arguments of local autonomy or temporary decrees. If such local
political concerns overshadow the need for racial equality in public schools,
then segregation will continue and Brown and its progeny may become a mere
footnote in legal history.
Joy HANNEL
140. See, e.g., St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 4, 1991, at 1, col. 5. When asked
why he was contributing to an anti-busing candidate in St. Louis, Samuel T.
Turnipseed stated, "[W]e lived separately for about 300 years until they [the federal
government] caused all this trouble in the last forty or so. Our federal government
tried to force [black people] down our throats. We were getting along fine without
them." Id. at 6, col. 1.
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